Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.
- Full article published in Sciforum, site of the FIS2010- 4th International Conference on the Foundations of Information Science, Beijin, August 2010.
- It has been published in a reviewed version in the issue of the journal TripleC 9(2), pp. 358-366: http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/285/285
- Presentation of the article at FIS2010 (including parts 1 and 2)