Is information a sufficient basis for cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s vision

José María Díaz Nafría (Science of Information Institute, Washington, U.S.A; Universidad de León, Spain) and Mario Pérez-Montoro (Department of Information Science, University of Barcelona, Spain)

Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.

• Full article published in Sciforum, site of the FIS2010- 4th International Conference on the Foundations of Information Science, Beijin, August 2010.
• It has been published in a reviewed version in the issue of the journal TripleC 9(2), pp. 358-366: http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/285/285
• Presentation of the article at FIS2010 (including parts 1 and 2)

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Is information a sufficient basis for cognition? Part 2: Physical foundations

José María Díaz Nafría (Science of Information Institute, Washington, U.S.A; Universidad de León, Spain) and Mario Pérez-Montoro (Department of Information Science, University of Barcelona, Spain)

In this second part of our inquiry into the relation between information and cognition, we delve into the physical limits of the manifestation of an arbitrary object first with independence of any observer, then considering the nature of perception. The analysis of the manifestations of an object in a homogeneous environment by means of wave phenomena shows that the information carried by such manifestations offers a constitutive fuzziness and ambiguity of the observed object. On the one hand, the details that can be specified concerning the object are strictly limited by the wave length; on the other hand, the volumetric details of the object (i.e. its bowls) are outlawed to the observer, not in virtue of the object opacity, but to the very dimension or complexity of the wave phenomenon in the space surrounding the object. The analysis of perception, considering this physical boundary and the specificity of the animal sensitivity, shows the combined role of other concurrent or previous percept and some a priori knowledge in the perception and awareness of reality.

• Full article published in Sciforum, site of the FIS2010- 4th International Conference on the Foundations of Information Science, Beijin, August 2010.
• It has been published in the issue of the journal TripleC 9(2), pp. 367-376: http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/286

 

The indeterminacy of observation

José María Díaz Nafría (Universidad de León)

An analysis of the wave manifestations of an object in a homogeneous environment shows that the information carried by such manifestations offers a constitutive fuzziness of the observed object. On the one hand, the details that can be specified concerning the object are strictly limited by the wave length; on the other hand, the volumetric details of the object (i.e. its bowls) are outlawed to the observer, not in virtue of the object opacity, but to the very dimension or complexity of the wave phenomenon in the space surrounding the object.

Given the nature of the limitations imposed by the wave phenomenon, they put forward some obvious epistemological consequences concerning: the constitutive indeterminacy of the object with respect to the information provided by the wave phenomenon; the absolute limit of the determinations that can be specified through observation; and the combined role of other concurrent or previous perceptions and some a priori knowledge in the image forming of the object by the subject.

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