World and mind, information and semantic content

Manuel Liz (Faculty of Philosophy, University of La Laguna, Canary Islands, Spain)

Many times, the notion of information is used in such a way that the following two theses are suggested: 1) that the world might be no more than information, and 2) that our minds might be no more that information. This paper rejects both theses. In relation to that, I will argue for the need to take into account non-informational aspects of reality that are epistemically accessible. Only that way, we could deal with the problem of selecting a determinate semantic content and with the problem of error. The two more common strategies to deal with these problems appeal to some primitive “referential capacities” or to some special kinds of (natural) “functions”. We propose another strategy based on very simple processes of signalization. With the help of that strategy, we offer a new way of defining semantic content.

• Full article published in Triple C, 7(2), special issue What is really information?
• Spanish article published in ¿Qué es información?, 2008

 

Information, world and mind

Manuel LIZ (Universidad Laguna)

The paper analyses the thesis that all reality may be, in the last term, no more than information and also the thesis that our mind may be, in the last term, no more that information. Both theses are rejected. And it is argued for the need to take into account non-informational aspects of reality which are epistemically accessible. Only that way, the problem of selecting a determinate semantic content and the problem of error could be faced. The two more common strategies to deal with these problems go through the appeal to some primitive “referential capacities” or to the appeal to some special kinds of “functions”. We propose another strategy, much more simple and explanatory, based on the notion of signalization. In relation to that notion, we offer a quite suggesting definition of semantic content, and we obtain some relevant consequences.

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